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1. INTRODUCTION
Three projects undertaken in the 1990’s studied the use of biological agents as weapons.
Under the Clinton administration, the Defense Intelligence Agency initiated Project Jefferson.
The purpose of the project was to recreate a genetically modified strain of the anthrax bacterium
that was reportedly created by Russian scientists in the early 1990’s. 1 Research was conducted to
determine if the strain created by the Russians were resistant to the current United States (U.S.)
anthrax vaccine. Experimentation conducted by the government on strains of bacteria was not the
only projects being pursued to understand biological weapons.
The second known project was initiated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who
contracted Battelle Memorial Institute to develop Project Clear Vision. Project Clear Water
researched reconstructing systems that could deliver biological agents. The main focus was
reconstructing the Soviet-designed biological bomblet after attempts to obtain the bomblet
failed. 2 Testing the bomblet in different atmospheric conditions was conducted to determine its
performance as well as dissemination characteristics. The project was defensive in nature and not
in violation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). 3
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency initiated a third project named Project Bacchus.
Project Bacchus utilized off-the-shelf equipment to build a biowarfare production facility
capable of mass producing anthrax bacterial stimulant. 4 This project had the potential to
determine the capabilities of terrorist organizations to conduct experiments and disseminate
biological weapons.
1

Jonathan B. Tucker, “Biological Threat Assessment: Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease,” Arms Control
Association. October 2004. www.armscontrol.org , 4; Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William J. Broad. "US
Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits.” The New York Times. September 4, 2001.
www.nytimes.com/2001/09/04/world/us-germ-warfare-research-pushes-treaty-limits.html, 2
2
Ibid., 4
3
Ibid
4
Tucker, “Bio Threat Assessment,”, 4
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These three projects have been debated as violating the 1972 BWC. The information
gathered through these projects, however, is revealing in determining adversary’s capabilities to
attack the U.S. using biological weapons. With current biosecurity policies, such projects are no
longer allowed. Research laboratories that work with dangerous pathogens have to follow strict
guidelines to produce vaccines, and research methods of infection by these pathogens.
In an article by Jonathan B. Tucker for the Arms Control Association, he describes the threat
of a biological weapons attack from a terrorist organization as being too exaggerated than is
possible. 5 In his article, he describes how the Bush administration initiated costly programs to
counter the threat of such attacks; these programs may be over inflated and not necessary to
national security. Production of vaccines and research on biological agents that may be
genetically modified to become more resistant to antibiotics is essentially useless if terrorist
groups are not capable of conducting such experiments or disseminating such agents. Spending
on such programs for the detection and defense against biological weapons continues today, but
is it necessary? Recently criticism has been given to various programs initiated to protect against
bioweapons including the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) three year program
BioWatch Generation-3. 6
In 2003 Boston University Medical Center (BUMC) won a bid with the National Institute of
Health (NIH) to conduct research on hazardous pathogens. This facility was built in 2008 and
named the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL) that is a seven-story,
192,000 square-foot facility. 7 It did not become operational until April 2012 due to local
5

Tucker, “Bio Threat Assessment,”, 1
. Government Accountability Office, Biosurveillance: Observations on BioWatch Generation-3 and Other Federal
Efforts, 2012; "BioWatch Contributors Pointed to Inaccurate Readings: Documents," NIT: Global Security
Newswire, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/biowatch-designers-alerted-us-inaccurate-readings/; David William, "Early
Warning on BioWatch." LA Times. http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/23/news/sc-dc-adv-biowatch-patents20120823 (accessed November 26, 2012).
7
Kirk Bansak, "Biodefense and Transparency," The Nonproliferation Review 18, no. 2 (2011): 349-350.
6
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opposition and is currently working at a Biosafety level 2 (BSL) on tuberculosis 8 instead of at a
BSL-4 as originally planned, for the purpose of developing countermeasures against agents that
may be used by bioterrorists. With the amount of funding of the project and the bid that won for
the study of biodefense, the facility is not working on any biological agents that can be used as
weapons in a biological weapons attack. One other program given scrutiny is the DHS’s
BioWatch program. According to the LA Times, BioWatch has produced faulty alarms and the
CDC commented that it would not provide emergency medical assistance based on a BioWatch
alarm. 9
The questionable ability of a terrorist organization to produce a biological weapon that can be
disseminated, and criticism for current programs aimed at early detection of biological agents is
an area for further study. There have been little or no updates to the assumptions that terrorist
organizations cannot produce biological weapons or disseminate the agents in an effective
manner. These assumptions need to be updated to reflect the advancement in technology and the
ease of access to information describing techniques in the scientific literature. Already there have
been acknowledgements that technology has advanced to a point where a certain level of higher
education, such as a bachelor’s degree of master’s degree, is no longer needed to conduct
complex experiments. 10 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have two
scenarios on their website as models for bioterrorist attacks; however, these models are outdated,
from 1999, and do not contain any of the new protocols that are being implemented today such

8

"Research Information ." Boston University Medical Campus National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories.
http://www.bu.edu/neidl/research/
9
"BioWatch Contributors Pointed to Inaccurate Readings: Documents,"; William,"Early Warning on BioWatch."
10
Institute of Medicine, Prepositioning Antibiotics for Anthrax (The National Academic Press, 2012), 5
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as the use of the Strategic National Stockpile and the role of DHS. 11 The models lack
recommended strategies for the future to implement to prevent such an attack.
Designing a scenario that highlights key assumptions that are lacking in the realm of
terrorists ability to use bacteria as a weapon is the goal of this thesis. Explaining the process of
how a domestic terrorist can acquire a biological agent and disseminate it using only knowledge
available through internet sources and scientific and academic literature will provide a new
perspective on how we perceive the capabilities of terrorist organizations. This will also assist in
how agencies will respond in the future with this knowledge.

11

Thomas V. Inglesby, “Anthrax: A Possible Case History,” Emerging and Infectious Diseases 5, no.4 (1999): 556560.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
To appreciate what it means to use a biological weapon and their effects on persons, it is
necessary to understand where it all started and the policies that are currently in place. Once this
appreciation for biological weapons is achieved, the explanation of why it is so tempting for
domestic terrorists to use biological agents will be given. There are already several cases of
domestic terrorism that have utilized biological weapons and these will be discussed in detail.
One other factor that must be discussed is the individuals known as biohackers. Although they
are only out to seek the truth in regards to biology, it is what they can offer to the non-scientific
individuals that become an issue.
2.1 Biosecurity Policy and Programs
As early as 400 B.C. army’s utilized biological weapons to defeat their enemies. It was
common practice to dip swords and tips of arrows into feces or dead corpses before attacking an
enemy army. 12 Another method, although not as effective, was to catapult corpses infected with
the plague over the walls of castles. 13 This was not an effective method due to Yersinia pestis,
the etiological agent of the plague, needing a vector to be passed from one individual to the next.
Fleas were the vectors and rats were the reservoir for the Y. pestis.
During these times, the effects of the techniques used could be viewed regardless of the
knowledge that microorganisms were the cause of deaths. It was not until the 1900’s that
microorganisms were identified to be the cause of diseases that are useful in warfare. It was this
knowledge that led to the creation of State sponsored biological weapons (BW) programs.

12

Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz, and John Hart. Chemical and Biological Warfare:A Comprehensive
Survey for the Concerned Citizen. (New York , NY: Copernicus Books , 2002), 219
13
Croddy, Chem and Bio Warfare, 220; Salerno, ”BW Risk Assessment,”27
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State sponsored BW programs were established in Canada, Great Britain, Japan, and the
Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s. Lenin started the BW program in the Soviet Union
during 1920 when he created Laboratory X. This was the location where research on toxic
biological products and poisons were carried out. In 1937, Laboratory X was transferred to the
Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD), translated Peoples Commissariat for Internal
Affairs, where research on biological products continued. 14 Germany and France started their
programs in the early 20th Century on the assumption that the Russians had been conducting
similar experiments. 15 The Germans conducted experiments with infecting food sources, mainly
animals, with glanders (Burkholderia mallei) and shipping them to the Allied powers during
World War I. Japan started their BW program around 1918 and was most notable in 1932 with
the creation of Unit 731. Most of Japan’s attacks were against the Chinese during WWII.
Japanese pilots would drop crates that contained rice and fleas carrying Y. pestis. The rice would
attract rats that would subsequently be infected with Y. pestis by the fleas. 16 The infected rats, in
turn, would serve as the source to infect more fleas that transmitted the microbe to humans.
The United States started a BW program during 1942 and ended its research and
development in 1969. 17 The first laboratory to be built for BW research was Camp Detrick (later
renamed Fort Detrick) located in Fredrick, Maryland. This army facility cost $13 million and
was operational in 1943. The agents being researched and developed were highly pathogenic
agents that were weaponized and stockpiled. Examples include Brucella spp Coxiella burnetii
and several other pathogens. Innocuous microbes such as Bacillus globigi and Serratia
14

For more detailed information regarding the Soviet Union BW program, refer to Alexander Kouzminov Biological
Espionage: Special Operations of hte Soviet and Russian Foreign Intelligence. (Mechanicsburg, PA: Grennhill
Books, 2005); Salerno, ”BW Risk Assessment,”27
15
Salerno, ”BW Risk Assessment,”28-29
16
For a complete list of BW programs and activities conducted by the Japanese, see Salerno, ”BW Risk
Assessment,”29-30; Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg. Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare.
(New York , NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999)
17
Salerno, ”BW Risk Assessment,”35
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marcescens were used as surrogates for testing purposes as simulation models for the highly
pathogenic agents. Testing the effects of different agents began in 1951 and ended in 1969 with
President Nixon’s National Security directive renouncing all offensive programs and production
of microbial and toxin agents. 18
The first attempt to curtail the use of biological weapons on the battlefield started in 1899
with the First Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War which banned “the use of
projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.” 19 The
use of chemical weapons during WWI was in direct violation of The Hague, and another attempt
by states to create an international law against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was started.
The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 1925 was the solution to stop the use of
WMD. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of both poisonous gas and bacteriological
weapons; however, it did nothing to stop states from acquiring and storing chemical and
biological weapons and had no verification or enforcement provisions. 20 The remedy for this
was the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).
The BWC was the first convention to ban an entire class of weapons, biological and toxin
weapons. The BWC was open for signature in April 1972 and entered into force on March 26
1975. In 2005, there were 153 member states to the BWC; excluding the U.S. 21 This convention
addressed what was lacking in previous attempts to curtail biological weapons, the prohibition of
the “development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of biological agents or

18

For a detailed explanation of the U.S. BW program, see Croddy, Chem and Bio Warfare, 231-233.
Joseph Cirincione, Jon B Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar. Deadly Aresenals: Nuclear , Biological, and
Chemical Threats. 2nd. (Washington , D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , 2005), 65
20
Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals, 35.
21
Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals, 35
19
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toxins.” 22 The convention held review conferences in 1980, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001, and
2002. The conferences were to update the BWC and make revisions when necessary. There was
still a weakness to the BWC, and that was the effectiveness of verification. 23
To address the issue of verification, the Ad Hoc Group was established in 1994. The Ad
Hoc group negotiated mainly in four areas 1) definitions and criteria, 2) incorporation and
transparency measures, 3) system of measures to promote compliance, and 4) full
implementation of Article X. 24 The success of the Ad Hoc group was never seen due to the
withdrawal of the U.S. from the treaty in July 2001. The U.S. claimed the protocol would
jeopardize the security of U.S. biotechnical and pharmaceutical secrets. 25 Despite the efforts
made to terminate the development of Biological Warfare Agent programs, a 1999 report
estimated that at least 10 nations and possibly 17 possess biological warfare agents. 26
The U.S. witnessed its first biological attack in 2001 when letters containing anthrax
were mailed and killed 5 people and sickened 17. In response to this and the September 11, 2001
attack on the Twin Towers in New York, President Bush signed the “Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001” most commonly known as the U.S. Patriot Act.
Within the U.S. Patriot Act, there is a section that deals with select agents, pathogens and
toxins used by bioterrorists that could present a severe threat to public health and safety.
22

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Final Declaration (Geneva, 3-21 March 1980), Document No.
BWC/CONF.I/10, p. 2.
23
Annabelle Duncan and Kenneth G. Johnson. "Viewpoint: Strengthening the BWC: Lessons from the UNSCOM
ecperience." The Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 2 (1997): 49; Oliver Meier. "Verification of the Biological
Weapons Convention: What is Needed." Medicine, Conflict and Survival 18, no. 2 (2002): 175-193
24
For detailed information regarding the Ad Hoc groups negotiations, see Special Conference of the States Parties to
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Report (Geneva, 19-30 September 1994), Document No.
BWC/SPCONF/1, Part II, p.10.
25
Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals, 65
26
John G. Bartlett. “Update in Infectious Diseases” Annals of Internal Medicine 131, no. 4 (1999): 278.
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Research on these biological and toxin agents are restricted by the U.S. Patriot Act to certain
persons for the express purpose of conducting research to develop treatment, prophylactic and
other countermeasures for potential bioterrorist agents. 27 The follow up to the U.S. Patriot Act
that further defines select agents is the June 2002 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, commonly referred to as the 2002 Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act. These two documents together require that participants in research with select
agents must follow procedures outlining the registration, inventory, and transfer of organisms
and toxins. Laboratories that possess, conduct experiments on, or transport select agents must
register with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 28
An inspection of the facility where the laboratory is located is also a requirement. Safety
and security training, notification after theft, loss, or release of the listed agent in the laboratory
are to be reported and records maintained. There are also mandatory Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) background checks for all personnel to have access, and to possess and work
with select agents. If any of these procedures are violated, there is a penalty of a fine and/or up to
no more than 10 years of imprisonment for the person violating these procedures. 29
The policies discussed above have covered restrictions that were implemented to prevent
the use and/or reduce the outcome of biological weapons being used against the U.S. There are
other policies/programs that have been created to assist in response to a biological weapon attack.
One such program is the creation of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. 30 The purpose of this
program is to have available a stockpile of bioterrorist agent countermeasures, such as vaccines,

27

107th US Congress Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, PL 107-56. October 26, 2001
28
107th US Congress Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, PL 107188, June 12, 2002
29
107th Congress US Patriot Act; 107th Congress 2002 Bioterrorism Preparedness Act.
30
Victoria Sutton, Law and Bioterrorism (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2003), 53.
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drugs and anti – toxins, controlled by the CDC, which can be deployed anywhere within the
continental U.S. within 12 hours. This program has since been renamed the Strategic National
Stockpile (SNS), but the principle and functions of the program remain the same.
Another useful program is the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) that was established
in August 1999. The LRN was established by HHS and the CDC in accordance with Presidential
Decision Directive 39 that outlined national anti-terrorism policies. 31 Any type of chemical or
bacterial agent that is thought to be a result of terrorism is sent to the local LRN in the city for
diagnostic testing. The LRNs were established in an effort to ensure more effective diagnostic
testing and communication between those that need to be informed regarding possible terrorist
attacks.
Lastly is one of the most scrutinized programs, BioWatch Generation - 3 (referred to as
BioWatch). In an effort to detect biological weapons released in the environment, DHS works
with state and local officials to mitigate the effects of such attacks. This program was established
to detect biological threat agents by taking air samples for testing and identification of agents to
provide a warning to the government and public health community. Experts have expressed their
concerns that the project is designed to detect mass biological attacks and would not detect
smaller localized attacks. 32 Other criticism was given to the program because the diagnostic test

31

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “The Laboratory Response Network Partners in Preparedness.” 2005,
http://emergency.cdc.gov/lrn/ (accessed February 19, 2013).
32
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The BioWatch Program: Detection of Bioterrorism,
by Dana A Shea and Sarah A. Lister. CRS Report RL32152. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32152.html
(accessed February 12, 2013).
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used to test the air samples collected by the BioWatch device yielded false results indicating that
tularemia was present in Houston, Texas area. 33
2.2 Domestic Terrorism
Domestic terrorism is defined by the RAND Corporation as violence against the civilian
population or infrastructure of a nation-often but not always by citizens of that nation and often
with the intent to intimidate, coerce, or influence national policy. 34 According to The U.S. Code
Title 18 domestic terrorism is defined as:
“…activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.” 35
In regards to these two definitions, there are common characteristics. Mainly the uses of violence
with the intent to coerce, intimidate, or influence a national policy.
Focusing on the political aspect of terrorism it can be broken down into two constituent
parts, seeking regime change or territorial change. 36 Territorial change is most often seen in
nationalist organizations such as Hamas or the Quebec Liberation Front. Religious groups such

33

David William, “The Biodefender That Cries Wolf” Los Angeles Times, July 08, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/08/nation/la-na-biowatch-20120708/4 (accessed November 16, 2012)
34
RAND Corporaton, “Domestic Terrorism” http://www.rand.org/topics/domestic-terrorism.html (accessed
February 12, 2013).
35
“Crimes and Criminal Procedures” Title 18 U.S. Code, Sec. 2331. definitions. 2012. Available
http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/18C113B.txt (accessed February 18, 2013).
36
Igancio Sánchez-Cuenca and Luis de la Calle, “Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence,”
Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 32-33
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as Aum Shinrikyo were seeking regime change and used biological and chemical weapons to
attempt to achieve this goal.
The use of violence can be considered to be armed propaganda or armed pressure. 37 For
propaganda, these terrorist groups are looking to gain the sympathies of the persons viewing the
acts. Armed pressure is attempting to achieve a change through negotiations in the form of
coercion. If using biological weapons, the amount of deaths can easily reach the thousands and
can be considered a form of armed pressure.
If a domestic terrorist group chooses to use biological weapons to achieve their goals, it
could fall under the category of the copycat phenomenon. 38 The use of biological weapons by
domestic extremist groups has risen over the years. The first incident is seen with the Rajneesh
cult poisoning several salad bars in Oregon, next Aum Shinrikyo’s attempt to weaponize a few
biological agents and then the 2001 Amerithrax attacks. This same effect was seen in school
shootings as explained by Loren Coleman. 39 In her paper, she demonstrates that an increased
number of shootings began after media coverage of one shooting. The phenomenon can be seen
occurring in regards to biological weapons with the example of Larry Wayne Harris. Numerous
hoaxes of anthrax threats occurred after his arrest in 1998 as a result of the media coverage of the
event.
Biological agents are not new to domestic terrorists. They have been used many times
whether successful or otherwise. Some cases that can be examined are the Rajneesh cult in 1984,
Aum Shinrikyo in the 1990’s, Larry Wayne Harris, and the most recent Amerithrax in 2001.

37

Ibid, 38.
Jessica Stern, “The Prospect of Domestic Bioterrorism,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4 (1999): 519
http://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/EID/vol5no4/ascii/stern.txt. (accessed December 09, 2012).
39
Loren Coleman “The Copycat Effect” adapted from The Copycat Effect How the Media and Popular Culture
Trigger Mayhem in Tomorrow’s Headlines (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc, 2004): 4-7.
http://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/images/file/Coleman_Copycateffect.pdf (accessed February 19, 2013).
38
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2.2.1 Rajneesh Cult 1984
Oregon 1984, 750 people were deliberately infected with a unique strain of Salmonella
enterica as a test plan for an upcoming election. The bacterium was poured onto salad bar foods
in The Dalles area; however, this was not the first time that The Dalles had been victim to
salmonella. This was just the only time that the effects were wide spread.
Bhagwan Shree Ranjneesh was a self-proclaimed guru from India. He purchased a ranch
in Wasco County and became an extremely charismatic leader of the Rajneeshee Cult. 40 The
group first obtained the salmonella bacteria from a medical supplier and used their own
laboratory equipment and university – trained microbiologists to culture it. 41 As a means to take
over the government in Wasco County, the cult attempted to test out the efficacy of their
salmonella strain first by poisoning two visiting Wasco County commissioners. The cult
members served cold beverages to the commissioners that were laced with salmonella. The
second attempt to test the bacterium was by sprinkling it on food at The Dalles shopping center.
Neither of these two events caused any recognition or symptoms of poisoning.
Originally the cult was going to contaminate the water system of The Dalles on Election
Day, but these two previous attempts to poison were unsuccessful. 42For this reason, the cult
decided to poison the salad bar in several restaurants, in The Dalles area. This method proved to
be effective, much more so than the cult thought it would be. As a result, many health officials
and investigators were brought into the county and the cult was unable to poison the water

40

Jonathan B. Tucker, “Historical Trend Related to Bioterrorism: An Empirical Analysis” Emerging and Infectious
Dieseases 5, no. 4 (1999): 502-503
41
Salerno, ”BW Risk Assessment,”36
42
Lawrence K. Grossman, “The Story of a Truly Contaminated Election,” Columbia Journalism Review (2001): 65
http://encore.utep.edu:50080/ebsco-web/ehost/detail?sid=5517c92d-421c-40ed-9eee66646e8bc833%40sessionmgr111&vid=1&hid=120&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=
ufh&AN=3970003 (accessed February 24, 2013).
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supply on Election Day. The cult participated in many other attempts in trying to sabotage the
voting, but none were effective or caused as much damage as the poisoning of the salad bar. 43
The cult eventually succumbed to internal conflict that led to its collapse. Many of the
members became informants for law enforcement and eventually this led to a raid one year later
in October 1985. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and local law enforcement found an
open vial of Salmonella enterica Typhimurium that matched the strain that was found in the
salad bar poisoning cases. 44 This is one case where a religious cult leader was able to manipulate
people into conducting acts that cause harm to others. An even greater threat from a religious
cult that utilizes biological and chemical weapons was Aum Shinrikyo.
2.2.2 Aum Shinrikyo 1990
Aum Shinrikyo was founded by Chizuo Matsumoto officially in 1987; however, it had its
beginnings in 1984 as a yoga school called Aum Inc. 45The cult had not turned to religion at this
time. The focus was that on the development of psychic powers by engaging in yoga. It was in
1985 that Matsumoto began his attempt at saving the world by declaring he was a sacred warrior
and hero charged with this duty. In 1986, he went to India and claimed to have met sages that
stated the world was heading towards catastrophe but did not have the appropriate spiritual
guidance to help. It was at this time Matsumoto formed his religious organization Aum Shinsen
no Kai whose goal was to restore “original Buddhism.” 46 Once Matsumoto began gathering
enough followers and receiving donations from them, he formed his first monastic community.
With the money gained, he started purchasing plots that would be the basis for his utopia. At this

43

Ibid.
Northwest Public Health “An Act of Bioterrorism: Oregon, 1984” Spring/Summer 2010
http://www.nwpublichealth.org/archives/s2010/an-act-of-bioterrorism-oregon-1984 (accessed February 24, 2013)
45
Richard Danzig and Others, Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical
Weapons, (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2011), 7-8
46
Danzig, Aum Shinrikyo:Bio and Chem Weapons, 8.
44
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point in time, the cult was renamed Aum Shinrikyo, “Aum Teaching of Truth” and Matsumoto
renamed himself Shoko Asahara. 47 By August 1989, the cult was granted legal recognition under
the Religious Corporations Law after initially being turned down for the request.
In 1990, Asahara made the decision to create a BW program after his defeat in the
parliamentary elections. The first agent that was used in testing was botulinum toxin extracted
from Clostridium botulinum. The leader of the BW program was Seiichi Endo, a graduate level
molecular biologist who had attended Kyoto University. Endo gathered soil samples where he
harvested C. botulinum used to produce the toxin. 48 Research was conducted in the laboratory
located at its Kamikuishiki headquarters at the base of Mt. Fuji that was built from funds
gathered through insurance fraud, a variety of front companies, and other criminal activities. 49
Approximately 450 metric tons of yellow liquid containing botulinum toxin was produced,
however, whether or not it was weapons grade is unknown. The majority of the yellow liquid
was thought to be the media that was used to cultivate C. botulinum. There was a case of a
member of the cult falling into the fermenter containing the yellow liquid; however, he never
showed any symptoms of botulism. 50
Attacks with botulinum toxin were carried out on two U.S. Naval bases, Narita Airport,
the Japanese Diet, the Imperial Palace and the headquarters of a rival religious group; however,
the attacks were unsuccessful. 51 It was this failure that led Asahara to look into different agents
to be used, mainly B. anthracis. Endo was once again the leader of this research, and it is
thought that he obtained Sterne or 34F2 strain which is used in vaccines of animals and livestock
from Obihiro University. This presents the question of why Endo would choose a benign strain
47
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to conduct biological attacks. Attacks using the benign strain of anthrax were conducted in June
and July 1993, which understandably failed. It is this and the previous failures at successfully
weaponizing and disseminating biological weapons that led to research, development, and
successful dissemination of chemical weapons.
2.2.3 Larry Wayne Harris
Larry Wayne Harris was a white-supremacist and born-again Christian who predicted
that biological attacks could be carried out by domestic groups. He was trained in microbiology
and boasted that he worked for several laboratories including a reference lab for the CIA. 52 He
stated that when he worked for the CIA it was to help train Iraq microbiologists. This is when he
made his self-appointed mission warn American’s of an upcoming biological attack from Iraq.
None of the laboratories that Harris claims to have conducted work related to biological weapons
have ever confirmed him as an employee.
Harris was arrested on May 12, 1995 for possession of Y. pestis and attempt to conduct
experiments using the bacteria to prepare for the imminent invasion from Iraq. 53 He was able to
obtain the three vials of the bacteria from the American Type Culture Collection by supplying
the company a fake letter head of his laboratory called “Small Animal Microbiology Laboratory”
with a fake approval number from the Environmental Protection Agency. 54 The CDC was
informed of his purchase and contacted Harris about his purchase. Harris informed the CDC that
he was using the research to write a survivalist book. As a result, he was arrested on May 12,
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1995 and April 22, 1997 he pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and received a sentence of
18 months of probation.
Harris then left to Las Vegas for a job testing a new device to kill microorganisms; his
employer thought he was a reputable microbiologist. He told his employer and their friends that
he worked for both the CIA and FBI on biological defense. The device he was supposed to be
testing was being sold by an engineer whom Harris told that he would be testing the device with
“military-grade anthrax.” 55 The engineer, Rockwell, phoned the FBI and on February 18, 1998
Harris was arrested on suspicion of having anthrax. There was no anthrax found, but he was
arrested for violation of his probation. A judge ruled that Harris would remain free; however, he
extended his probation by five months. 56
His arrest in 1998 received coverage by the media and sparked a smattering of anthrax
hoaxes. The number of hoaxes is not exactly known but is estimated to range in the hundreds. 57
An agency in Phoenix received an anthrax threat by mail that resulted in the quarantine of 10
people and the evacuation of several buildings. Even more letters were sent to locations around
the U.S claiming to have anthrax. Federal buildings in Rochester, New York had to undergo
decontamination procedures after an employee opened a letter containing an anthrax threat.
Threats did not stop until early 2000 and businesses were not the only targets; abortion clinics
and even schools had received anthrax threats. 58 The hoaxes ended in 2000, but a real attack
utilizing anthrax occurred in 2001.
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2.2.4 Amerithrax 2001
In 2001, shortly after the attacks on 9/11, several letters containing anthrax were mailed
to United States Senators Patrick Leahy and Thomas Daschle in the District of Columbia and to
media organizations in New York and Boca Raton, Florida. Because of these mailings, 22
individuals contracted anthrax either by inhaling the spores or by absorbing the spores through
the skin, known as cutaneous anthrax. 59 As a result of the mailings, over 30 postal facilities and
commercial mailrooms were contaminated with the spores and 5 individuals died from inhalation
anthrax.
The first “person of interest” named by Attorney General John Ashcroft was Dr. Steven J.
Hatfill a former U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
scientist and expert in biodefense. 60 With the advance of scientific breakthroughs, Dr. Hatfill was
cleared of all suspicions when laboratory testing determined he did not have access to the Ames
strain used in the attacks. In 2003, Dr. Hatfill sued Attorney General Ashcroft for violation of his
privacy and was awarded $5.82 million in 2008 as settlement. 61
The next suspect in the case was Dr. Bruce E. Ivins who was a senior microbiologist in
the Bacteriology Division of USAMRIID. Dr. Ivins was considered the nation’s foremost experts
in the production and purification of B.anthracis. 62 According to the FBI investigation he had
the opportunity, access and the ability to carry out these attacks. His motive for conducting such
attacks was because his work on a vaccine. Unless he could meet potency standards set by the
FDA, his research would be halted. This purportedly would only occur in the presence of an
59
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unexpected event such as a need to vaccinate a large population. 63 One other telling piece of
evidence was the language used in the letters, the “code” that was within the letters, matched
notes from Dr. Ivins notebooks. 64
In the summer of 2008, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia
was seeking authorization from a federal grand jury to return an indictment charging Dr. Ivins in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332a (Use of a Weapons of Mass
Destruction). 65 Before the process was completed Dr. Ivins died as a result of an overdose from
over – the – counter drugs. The FBI ended its seven year investigation and officially closed the
case February 19, 2010. 66
2.3 Biohackers
For the amateur scientist, biohackers, working out of their garage attempting to learn
more on their own; they no longer have to work alone, or in their garage. A movement known as
do-it-yourself bio (DIYbio) has brought all of these biohackers together to conduct experiments
and learn science without needing a college degree to do so. 67 Ellen Jorgensen, creator of
Genspace, has made it possible for everyone to learn how to conduct science experiments in a
controlled laboratory just for fun. 68 In these labs, it is possible to sequence your own DNA, make
bacteria grow and research biofuels, all without having to worry about fulfilling grant
requirements or having reasoning behind the research being are pursuing.
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The skills to conduct experiments can be learned in such labs. DIYbio is happening all
over the world and giving access to those who seek to learn more about biology. Like everything
that is offered for the advancement of knowledge, it can be exploited. DIYbio laboratories do not
conduct experiments on pathogenic bacteria, but the skills to do so can be learned in their
laboratories. As Ellen Jorgensen stated in her talk on TED Talks, “ we don’t work with
pathogens…if you work with a pathogen you’re not part of the biohackers community, you’re
part of the bioterrorist community” and she further goes on to explain how such programs
benefits outweigh the risks. 69
Advancements in biology are happening rather quickly and a guide on how to replicate
most of these experiments can be found almost anywhere. For instance, the DIYbio hackerspace
BioCurious has developed a bioprinter that is able to print cells onto surfaces such as petri
dishes. This printer can be easily created using parts from an HP 5150 Inkjet printer. 70
Availability of manuals from DIYbio laboratories is becoming greater since its creation in 2009.
More individuals can learn techniques in a variety of biology fields and all from the comfort of a
non-school setting.
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN
This thesis will utilize the Structured Analytic Technique, What If? Analysis. 71
Recognizing early signs/indicators of a significant event, such as a terrorist attack, leads to
policies that can be implemented to reduce or prevent the event from occurring. Utilizing this
method will allow answers to be generated for questions aimed at determining the outcome of
the event, the impact of the event, and whether the possibility has increased for the event to
occur. If the event is not prevented the What If? Analysis allows for a better understanding of
how to respond to a significant event such as a terrorist organization attacking the U.S. with a
biological weapon. Key assumptions will be addressed in the discussion section of this thesis in
order to allow the reader to define and create their own key assumptions. Indicators can also be
compared with the authors in the discussion section.
The location of the scenario will take place in Houston, Texas and target locations are
modeled after real locations within the city. The names of the locations chosen will remain
anonymous to protect the integrity of those locations; however the capacity and structural models
will be used in the scenario.
The aim of the scenario is to utilize the internet, social media sites, and scientific
literature to demonstrate that technology for scientific experiment has advanced considerably
since the 2001 Amerithrax attacks. Advancements include detection of biological agents that
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used old methods in innovative ways. 72 This scenario will also demonstrate that the level of
education that one needs is a high school level, junior or senior, or a basic college education.
A domestic terrorist group will be defined and given a purpose for initiating the attacks.
The ideology of the terrorist group will be defined in the methodology section to understand how
the What If? Analysis was designed. It is at the authors discretion to rationalize the actions of the
domestic terrorist group with evidence in the literature i.e. newspaper articles, academic journals
etc. After the ideology of the terrorist group has been defined, the location of the laboratory and
all necessary preparation will be broken down into constituent parts in order to analyze how a
group can weaponize anthrax. The parts include location, facility setup, laboratory equipment,
selection and acquisition of biological agent, propagation of the agent, and weaponization of the
agent. This will be followed by the selection of a target and the method of delivery for the
subsequent target(s).
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4. METHODOLOGY
4.1 Domestic Terrorist Group
The domestic terrorist group for this scenario can be described using three characteristics
from Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle. 73
1. Seeking a territorial change
2. Achieves this through armed pressure
3. Using violence to compensate for a loss in social movement
As described in the literature review, each domestic terrorist group has its own ideology that
they follow. For this group, they are seeking immigration reform for the city of Houston, Texas.
Census data show that in certain super neighborhoods, in Houston, the population of ethnic
minorities is increasing significantly. 74 The Hispanic population in Houston has risen more than
any other ethnicity, and the white population is decreasing each year. Immigration reform
appears to be leaning in the direction of amnesty for those who have entered into the U.S.
illegally. Although far from being an easy process, it is becoming a hot topic that could lead to
millions of undocumented immigrants gaining citizenship. 75
This domestic terrorist group is against having millions of undocumented immigrants enter
into the U.S. Individuals in this group feel strongly that adding millions of immigrants to the
U.S. will affect their ability to obtain health care, adsorb the city’s budget, and present an over
whelming burden on the taxpayers and their benefits. 76 This domestic terrorist group has been a
73
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staunch supporter to the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, more
commonly known as SB 1070, which was passed in Arizona in April 2010. Since then, this
group has been preparing for “ethnic cleansing” of their own. 77
For these reasons, this group has decided to act on their own to remove the immigrants
themselves. Following the characteristics listed above, this terrorist group seeks a territorial
change in the sense of reducing the amount of ethnic diversity especially among the Hispanics
within the city of Houston. They will achieve this through the method of copycat phenomenon,
discussed in the literature review, to amplify fear to seek a policy change regarding immigration
reform. The method they will copy is the letters that were sent during the 2001 Amerithrax
attacks. However, this method will only be used to incite fear. An actual attack will be conducted
at a location that is to be decided. This group has now decided to resort to violence to
compensate for the loss of a social movement, removing undocumented immigrants from the city
of Houston. They have decided to use Bacillus anthracis as the biological agent for the purpose
that it has been used in several domestic terrorist attacks already, and it is naturally occurring in
the environment, leading to easy access.
This group contains 17 members all from different backgrounds. There are individuals that
are licensed nurses, teachers, unemployed, and ranchers. The variability of the groups work
experience is necessary for the targets that are selected in the attack and the location of the
laboratory setup. Individuals in the group do not have a criminal background, and are of varying
ages comprising both men and women. The youngest in the group is 22 years old, and the oldest
in the group is 46 years old. Planning the attack starts in 2010 and will be carried out in 2014
after all preparations have been thoroughly made.
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4.2 Laboratory Setup
Setting up a laboratory that will go unnoticed by the FBI field office in Houston and local
law enforcement is a top priority. Location of the laboratory plays a critical role in being able to
manufacture enough anthrax to conduct an effective attack for the purposes of this domestic
terrorist group. Not only is the location of the laboratory key, it is essential setup the facility to
be able to manufacture the anthrax. The laboratory equipment that will be used to weaponize
anthrax is also a crucial consideration. Once the facility has been setup with the laboratory
equipment, it is possible to start testing areas for anthrax spores that can be cultured and
manufactured for dissemination purposes.
4.2.1 Location
In Texas, there are several counties where B. anthracis is naturally occurring in the soil,
Crockett, Edwards, Kinney, Maverick and a few other counties. 78 Given that Texas is the second
largest state in the U.S. there are many locations that are isolated from urban areas. Areas that are
isolated tend to be for ranchers and hunters in the counties listed previously. Edwards’s County,
where B. anthracis is naturally occurring, has land for sale by the acres for ranching and hunting
purposes. These areas range from 0.55 acres to 2,000 acres. These areas provide sufficient
acreage to construct a laboratory for the purpose of manufacturing anthrax. Economic feasibility
is a factor that is considered in choosing the location. In Rocksprings, Texas, there is a location
for the purposes of hunting that can easily fit a trailer or house turned laboratory. It is 36 acres
for the price of $49, 500. 79 This location is ideal for concealment and privacy in manufacturing
anthrax. It is accessible by all-weather country road and 15 miles outside of the city of
78
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Rocksprings, Texas. The size and isolation that this location offers make it an ideal area to
sample soil for B. anthracis and cultivate anthrax spores.
Rocksprings, Texas is a total of 332 miles from Houston if driving I-10 W and 351 miles
if driving TX-71 W and I-10 W. Laboratory equipment that is purchased by group members in
Houston can easily be concealed in the bed of a truck or the trunk of a car and driven to the
location. This location also allows for easy access into Uvalde County, approximately a 1 hour
and 10 minute drive, where a rare strain of B. anthracis, Ames strain, had been discovered. 80
Although it is highly unlikely to gather this strain while soil sampling, there is the possibility of
obtaining this rare and fatal strain.
4.2.2 Facility Setup
The selection of the location allows for the group to place a trailer within the 36 acres.
This trailer would function as a laboratory for the purpose of manufacturing anthrax. Electricity
is present in this location; however, the trailer will run off of generators that can be purchased
online or at any home improvement store. Generators can cost anywhere from $199.99 to
$4,497.00 depending on the model and the location in which it is purchased.
The ideal location for the laboratory would be in the kitchen portion of the trailer. The
stove can be used in place of a Bunsen burner, and the refrigerator can be used to store samples
of spores and bacteria not being used. The open area allows for movement and placement of
laboratory equipment where needed. Air filtration is not a necessity since B. anthracis is not a
communicable disease. However, to prevent infecting the laboratory worker sporicides can be
purchased and used to sterilize the working area. To prevent inhalation once spore production
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has begun, the laboratory worker can easily purchase a gas mask or a simple dust mask and avoid
touching mucosal surfaces with their hands. 81 If, however, the need arises to put in a filtration
system the most commonly used is the high – efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter which can
cost anywhere from $48.55 to $499.00 depending on the size and model.
4.2.3 Laboratory Equipment
Common laboratory equipment for a microbiology laboratory can be purchased online
from retailers such as Amazon, eBay, and craigslist. This makes purchasing and setting up a
laboratory relatively easy and at minimal cost. The total cost of equipment can have a wide range
depending on the make, model and size of equipment purchased as well as the from which
manufacturer it is purchased (see Table 4.1). Table 4.1 includes only the essential materials
needed for the initial setup of the laboratory. The cost of restocking items is not included in this
table or personal protective equipment. Factoring in the land, facility setup and personal
protective equipment would increase the cost by at least $51,000.
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Table 4.1: Laboratory Equipment and Prices

Equipment

Cost Range (lowest-highest)*

Autoclave

$279.95 – $1,479.95

Centrifuge

$180.91 - $813.45

Centrifuge Tubes

$7.26 - $186.62

Drying Oven

$494.95 - $1,828.35

Erlenmeyer Flask

$3.00 - $28.50

Gram Stain Kit

$22.50 – $61.45

Incubator

$357.89 – 2,779.14

Inoculating Loop/ Needle

$2.50 – $44.00

Lyophilizer (dry freezer)**

$675.00 - $9,000.00

Micropipette

$77.90 - $149.99

Micropipette Tips

$11.00 – $13.79

Microscope

$74.98 - $194.99

Mortar and Pestle

$3.56 - $55.70

Motility Test Kit

$22.90 – $130.95

Petri Dish

$7.50 - $15.00

Sheep Blood Agar Petri Dishes (10/pk)

$24.95 – $28.94

Slides and Cover Slips

$4.99 - $13.70

Trypticase Soy Broth

$9.00 - $156.14

Total

$2,260.74 – $16,980.66

*Prices vary depending on company used and model purchased
**A lyophilizer can be used in place of the drying oven or to store frozen samples of
spores.
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Another factor that affects the equipment and cost, is the method chosen for
manufacturing anthrax. There are many different ways in which one can culture a B. anthracis
strain into spore form. Methods can differ in use of agar or broth mediums –agars are solid forms
of broth mixtures – and the agar/broth used. Turning B. anthracis into a powder form has just as
many different methods, as well. Common methods used are lyophilizers, spray dryers, sieves
and mortar and pestle. 82 Each method chosen can lead to different equipment purchased and
overall cost.
B. anthracis is a facultative anaerobic bacterium which means that it can be grown in the
presence of oxygen or without oxygen. This allows for either the use of incubating in flasks that
contain liquid media or the use of a fermenter respectively.
4.3 Acquisition of Biological Agent
B. anthracis can be harvested from the soil in areas where it naturally occurs. Other
opportune areas to gather a sample are from dead livestock and animals in the area. The bacteria
can be found on hides of animals, horns, hoofs, or other tissues from the carcasses of dead
animals. Multiple samples will need to be gathered. For soil samples, all that is needed is to
gather soil from an area and place it in a container that can be taken back to the laboratory for
testing. Steps for testing soil samples are common and regular in the laboratory and can be
demonstrated with a simple flow diagram (see Figure 4.1).
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Collect soil sample

Suspend soil sample in saline
solution

Plate solution onto Sheep Blood Agar and
incubate at 37°C for 18-24 hr

Perform Gram stain

Gram-negative

Gram-positive

No B. anthracis

Motility test

Motility

No Motility

No B. anthracis

B. anthracis

Inoculate in mice to determine virulence

Figure 4.1: Flow Diagram for the Process of Isolating B. anthracis from Soil Samples

B. anthracis grows ideally on Sheep Blood Agar (SBA) that can be purchased
commercially. When plated, bacteria will form colonies that are comma – shaped projections that
produce the “Medusa head”, have a ground glass appearance, and tenacious consistency. 83 To
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ensure the organism on the plate is B. anthracis a Gram stain is needed. B. anthracis is a gram
positive rod shaped bacteria and will appear purple under a microscope. 84
Once the motility test has been administered and the organism is presumed to be B.
anthracis, it is possible to inoculate mice to determine if the strain is virulent (optional). The
mice that die from inoculation carry the virulent strain and a blood smear can be conducted to
obtain the strain. Mice can be purchased from a pet store, and numerous tests will need to be
conducted to rule out mice deaths from other causes. Once this strain has been obtained a culture
of the strain can begin and be prepared for spore production.
4.4 Weaponizing B. anthracis
Weaponizing B. anthracis is not all together that hard to do. The issue becomes how to
disseminate it correctly to have the greatest effect. This group plans to use anthrax in relatively
small amounts and in an enclosed area. How to get started on weaponizing B. anthracis starts
with a simple internet search (see appendix p.67), most of the information to weaponize anthrax
is just a click away. Sometimes the information is outdated, but a little research can lead to the
correct methods and answers.
Once B. anthracis has been isolated it can be inoculated into an Erlenmeyer flask with
trypticase soy broth, shaken for 6hr at 37°C and then plated on nutrient media to form spores or
it can be plated on SBA plates and wait until spore formation has occurred. 85 Continuous culture
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in a chemostat, Erlenmeyer flask while shaken, or a fermenter can be used to produce and
maintain spores. 86 The method chosen by the author requires plating on SBA or on nutrient rich
agar to allow sporulation (growth of spores). This method is one of the cheapest and requires
little knowledge in chemical compounds if using SBA; however, the author suggests nutrient
media for highest yield of spores and is depicted in the flow diagram (see Figure 4.2).

Plate B. anthracis on Nutrient Agar
Incubate at 37°C for 18h-10d

Add PBS to plates and incubate at room
temperature for 10 mins

Suspend spores in sterile distilled water
and wash by centrifuge

Dry spores

Lyophilizer

Store in freezer at 4°C
in water or at -20°C

Dry oven

Mill with mortar and
pestle

Mill with mortar and
pestle

Figure 4.2: Flow Diagram for the Production of Anthrax Spores

“Bacillus and Recently Derived Genera” In Manual of Clinical Microbiology, 7th edition, edited by Murray and
Others (Washington D.C.: ASM Press, 1999), 357-360. Chemicals for nutrient broth can be obtained from any
online store.
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To harvest spores, add phosphate buffered saline (over the counter saline solution from a
local drug store will work for this step) and incubate for 10 min to allow easy removal of spores.
Once spores have been washed in a centrifuge (at least three times), there are two methods to
drying the spores. Using a lyophilizer is more complicated than a drying oven, but it allows
freezing of the spores to be stored for later use. 87 Once dried, spores can be turned to powder
using a simple mortar and pestle. It is possible to add nanoparticle silica or bentonite to keep the
spores suspended in the air for longer durations; however, this is not necessary to form the
powder of spores.
4.5 Target Selection and Dissemination
Target selection was determined by the amount of damage that could be achieved in a
given location. The target was chosen based on the categories of economic impact, panic,
political statement, population at the location at any given time, lack of security surrounding the
area, and ease of access to the area (see Table 4.2). Each location chosen was given a number to
the corresponding category to determine the best possible target. The target with the highest
number was chosen for the attack.
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The complete process for freeze drying can be obtained at OPS Diagnostics “Bacteria Freeze Drying Protocol”
http://www.opsdiagnostics.com/notes/ranpri/rpbacteriafdprotocol.htm (accessed March 15, 2013)
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Table 4.2: Target selection matrix

In this case, the entertainment venue and the hospital are the two targets that scored the
highest with 28 and 27, respectively. In order to create the most effective attack that will
generate the most fear, it was decided by the author to use a cascade attack. The attacks will be
timed so that individuals are not infected at the same time.
Given that members of the group are from varying backgrounds and planning is for 4
years, the hospital will be the first to be targeted to initiate fear. Antibiotics that are administered
to patients will hamper the effects of the agent, so it is decided that the newborn nursery and the
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) will be the best targets. Infants that are not breast feeding
or that are left in hospital care overnight, receive a premeasured amount of formula in 59 ml
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bottles that have to be discarded one hour after opening. 88 This allows for a nurse to inject B.
anthracis directly into the bottles for infants to ingest. Other patients at the hospital such as post
– operation patients and terminally ill patients are given food brought in by a nurse or Certified
Nurses Aid (CNA). This would allow for either employee to contaminate the food by adding B.
anthracis to broths or to drinks of the patients. An aerosolized attack of anthrax is what is feared
the most and sensors are being used to test the air to detect biological contaminants; however, an
attack using the ingested form of anthrax has not been prepared for in the literature. 89 Little is
known about the effects of gastrointestinal anthrax (GI) due to the limited amount of cases that
have been presented. 90
Hospitals that are contaminated with anthrax spores will have to be shut down. Hospital
business will be slowed while other hospitals will be overcrowded with patients from the
contaminated hospitals. Fear will be instilled in the public about attending hospitals and possibly
getting infected with anthrax.
While the hospitals are being shut down, a second attack will occur that will cause
individuals to seek medical attention after a number of hospitals have been shut down. If the
timing is correct, then the hospitals and clinics that remain open will be overwhelmed with the
amount of individuals that are seeking medical attention. The entertainment venue is a target that
will be filled with enough people to infect and cause overcrowding in hospitals. This venue will
have a capacity of 18,043. Having individuals on the security team for an event will allow access
88

This information was confirmed by email correspondence with a lactation specialist at a Houston hospital that has
a newborn nursery and NICU.
89
Guidelines for inhalation anthrax and cutaneous anthrax are given by the CDC, Eric Jacob Stern and Others,
“Conference Report on Public Health and Clinical Guideline for Anthrax,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 14, no. 4
(2008) http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/14/4/07-0969.htm (accessed March 16, 2013).
90
Jeannette Guarner and Carlos del Rio, “Pathology, Diagnosis, and Treatment of Anthrax in Humans” In Bacillus
anthracis and Anthrax Edited by Nicholas H. Bergman (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2011), 255-256,
263.
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to the building and the opportunity to setup a system that can distribute the anthrax spores
effectively. Instead of using the ventilation system the group decided to use a timed detonator
attached to a small firework such as a pack of Black Cats. 91 Once the firework ignites if attached
to a bag containing anthrax spores this will cause the spores to be released into the air during the
event and will go unnoticed when music is being played. The low intensity of the Black Cat
would damage some of the spores but would likely leave many still viable.
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Videos on the internet demonstrate how to create timed detonators to ignite different materials. This video clip
explains how to create an electric timed detonator using household products, Phil Lonsdale, “How to How to Make a
Timed Detonator for Lighting Fireworks Safely,”Wonder How To. http://explosives.wonderhowto.com/how-to/tomake-timed-detonator-for-lighting-fireworks-safely-425938/ (accessed March 18, 2013).
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5. WHAT IF? ANALYSIS
The Houston Chronicle on March 26, 2014 reported 23 “mysterious” infant deaths from
three separate hospitals. Hospital officials when contacted stated that mother and infant had no
adverse symptoms prior to release from the hospital. Hospital officials stated that in more than
half the cases, the mother and infant had been previously released shortly after giving birth.
Mothers returned to the hospital with the infants within two to three days after release reporting
symptoms of fever reaching 101°F, vomiting, and diarrhea. Infants were admitted into the
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) where shortly after, death resulted in all cases. Others
cases showed that infants were just released from NICU, having been admitted for premature
birth, and returned to their mothers for release from the hospital. These cases resulted in return to
the hospital with in one to three days later. The same response was initiated with infants being
admitted to NICU and death followed shortly. The mothers in all cases were unaffected. Hospital
staffs at each facility have not yet determined the cause of the deaths but have stated they are
investigating.
On March 27 the same hospitals where increases in infant deaths were reported released a
statement to the Houston Chronicle and local news stations. Hospital officials reported an
increase in deaths in patients receiving post-operation care, and patients receiving care for
terminal illnesses. In each of these cases, a report was given of high fever around 102°F, nausea,
bloody diarrhea, and vomiting. Patients were already receiving antibiotics for each of their
respective conditions. Hospital officials stated they were looking into the cause of the deaths, but
no conclusions could be given at the time.
Later that day on local news station the lead anchor made a comment of a possible new
hospital acquired infection. The news anchor used the words “new superbug” that was able to
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resist the antibiotics that patients were receiving in the hospital. This sparked wide spread
speculation on the internet on social media forums. Comments were being left on social media
sites scrutinizing the three hospitals where the infant deaths were first reported and criticism of
hospital leaders to correctly identify the cause of death.
At the time, representatives from each hospital where the deaths were occurring agreed to
meet to discuss the possible causes of death. Acting board members from each hospital in the
areas of malpractice, public relations, and epidemiology discussed the possible causes of deaths
in each patient. The representatives from the hospitals realized that most patients from the postoperations (post – op) had been released one to two days prior to infants and returned with
similar symptoms. In each case when the patient returned death resulted in 24 – 48 hours.
Persons that were in contact with the deceased did not show the same symptoms and a
communicable disease was ruled out as a possible cause of death. Each verified that samples of
blood had been sent for testing and agree to contact other hospitals to investigate similar cases.
In total for all three hospitals, a report of 26 infant deaths, 12 post-op patient deaths, and 16
terminally ill patient deaths was recorded. This brought the total of deaths to 54 persons by
unknown causes. An attempt to contact patients who were released from the hospital following
post-op care was agreed to take place the following day for all three hospitals.
The decision to contact the Health Authority (HA) and the Houston Department of Health
and Human Services (HDHHS) to coordinate contacting patients was made during this meeting.
Results from the laboratory reports and autopsies would be given to the HDHHS to determine
the correct response and provide health risk communication services if needed. Investigation of
patient history and emergency contacts was conducted by the HDHHS in an attempt to determine
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the source of the infections that led to deaths of 54 patients. The Mayor was contacted to inform
him of the situation to avoid surprises if he was watching the news.
On March 28, members of the HDHHS attempted to contact previous patients who were
released after post – op care from the three hospitals and also other hospitals in the region. From
those who were able to be contacted there were a total of eight patients who experienced similar
symptoms to those described; however, symptoms were mild and seemed to subside after two to
three days. Three other patients reported no symptoms and two patients were reported dead who
did experience the same symptoms; however, they did not seek medical attention. No patients
from other hospitals were experiencing the same symptoms and causes of death. Results from the
laboratory were inconclusive, and further testing was being conducted. Autopsy results were not
yet received from infant or post – op patients.
At 9:08 A.M. on March 28, two local news stations received letters addressed from local
schools in the area. Upon opening the letters addressed to the stations, a white powdery
substance was released from the envelopes. The FBI was immediately contacted following the
incident. The contents of the first letter state:
I HAVE THE ANTHRAX
YOU NEED TO TAKE PENICILLIN
BE PREPARED TO DIE
DEATH TO IMMIGRANTS
DEATH TO THE INFERIOR RACE
The contents of the second letter state:
YOU WILL DIE
TAKE YOUR MEDICATION
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THOSE WHO DON’T DESERVE WILL DIE
DEATH TO IMMIGRANTS
DEATH TO THE INFERIOR RACE
While the FBI was contacted by the local news stations regarding the suspicious
envelopes, personnel from the hospital who had previously called in sick were showing up to the
hospital with symptoms of fever above 101°F, muscle aches, sore throat, and breathing
problems. They are prescribed broad spectrum antibiotics and sent home. The affected staffs who
are reporting symptoms do not match symptoms in the cases that resulted in death from unknown
causes. No connection is made to anthrax since only the FBI is aware of the anthrax letters that
were sent to the news stations.
Laboratory results from post – op patients and infants showed an organism that is non –
motile, a gram – positive rod, and when grown on sheep blood agar presents as flat ground glass
non hemolytic colonies. Samples of the blood from patients were then sent to the local
Laboratory Response Network (LRN) for further testing to determine the organism. Suspicions
began to form of a possible anthrax attack on the hospitals; however, this was not reported to any
media outlets for fear of creating panic in the city of Houston.
Autopsy reports of infants and post – op patients showed hemorrhagic ulcers in the ileum
and cecum of the gastrointestinal tract (GI) and are determined to be the site of entry for the
organism. Lesions along the GI tract in the jejunum, duodenum, and esophagus are reported in
infants and post – op patients. Upon further examination under the microscope, ulcers show
extensive acute hemorrhage, edema, and necrosis. Samples from lymphatic vessels were sent to
the local LRN for further testing following the previous findings in the local laboratories of the
hospitals. In some of the infants and post – op patients, there were pleural effusions and edema
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and hemorrhage of mediastinal lymph nodes. Samples were gathered from the lymph nodes and
sent to the LRN for further testing. Autopsy results from the terminally ill patients were given
further investigation to eliminate their illness as a possible cause of death. However, results from
these patients showed similar findings to those obtained in infants and post – op patients.
The FBI and local law enforcement are contacted about the incident at the hospitals and
given the details of the laboratory findings and the patient information. The investigation
conducted by the HDHHS determined that the only hospitals that were affected by this incident
were the three hospitals where the “mysterious” deaths were first reported. This together with the
letters sent to the local news stations leads to the possibility of a bioterrorist attack.
Knowing the possible agent in the letters, the FBI conducted a field anthrax test on the letters,
and it appears negative. Samples were being tested at the LRN. One lab worker comments that
the white powdery substance has the consistency of baby powder and smells like it too. Upon
further testing, his statements are true. However, testing continued to determine if there were any
traces of residue mixed in with the baby powder.
FBI began to investigate the connection between the letters and the hospital incidents.
The letters seemed to be referring to an attack against different ethnicities notably “immigrants”
and the “inferior race”. The FBI investigated the deaths that occurred at the hospital and
discovered a link to the letters. In all of the deaths, the individuals were of a minority ethnicity.
Not one case was anything but an ethnicity that is a minority. However, with this new
information, the FBI requested that hospitals be tested with field kits to determine if anthrax was
released in hospitals or outside hospitals.
At this time, a leak from the media about the letters was sent to the local news stations.
The incident was not being reported on national new stations and informs the public that there
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was “anthrax sent to local news stations in Houston, Texas that appear to have the same style of
writing as the letters that were first mailed 2001” the news anchor then gives a synopsis of the
2001 anthrax letters case that occurred over 10 years previous. As a response to this statement,
social media forums are flooding news station sites with comments about a possibility of the FBI
not having solved the case and the perpetrator is still at large and now attacking Houston.
Local news stations in Houston commented on the letters and report that field tests
provided a negative for anthrax. News anchors attempt to dispel the false information about the
comments surrounding the FBI not having “caught” the right individual that mailed the letters in
2001. A special report was given on the hospitals status of the causes of deaths that were first
reported on March 26. Information about anthrax being the cause is not yet released so as not to
spread fear to the public of the situation if it is not anthrax. Local news anchors stated that until
further information is given to them regarding the situation individuals should not be afraid to
attend hospitals. Those affected were infants and individuals who were immuno – compromised
who could have suffered some other complication.
During this statement, FBI personnel conducted anthrax field tests at each of the hospitals
reported. The field tests showed positive for traces of anthrax in newborn nurseries, NICU,
patients’ rooms from the post – op patients and terminally ill patients. Other areas were tested
for traces of anthrax in the hospital to determine the scope of contamination. The FBI requested a
team to enter each hospital to gather evidence in the rooms with anthrax testing positive and send
any samples to the CDC.
The Health Authority (HA) was contacted by the FBI to determine the situation.
HA officials determine that since anthrax is not communicable patients from the hospital can be
sent to other hospitals to continue their treatment. The order to evacuate hospitals was given
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immediately, and patients were sent to facilities that could care for patients need. Hospitals in the
surrounding area that had not been contaminated are preparing to receive patients that were
coming in. HA officials order that individuals in hospitals that were contaminated need to
receive antibiotics, specifically ciproflaxin for those that were in the areas that tested positive for
anthrax.
Family members of those who were treated in the hospitals with anthrax contamination
were notified by hospital staff and HDHHS personnel. Family members are notified of the
hospitals where the patients were taken to and to remain calm; patients would be receiving
antibiotics and continue to be monitored for symptoms similar to those in previous patients.
The Mayor is contacted at this time and made aware of the situation and appointed a
Public Information Officer (PIO). Officials from HA and HDHHS believed there were enough
antibiotics to give to all those in the affected area and determined there was no need to reach out
for sources from surrounding areas. The HA contacted the Catastrophic Medical Operations
Center (CMOC) to assist with medical resources if need be. For the time, the HA determined that
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) needed to be used to coordinate the situation
effectively and keep communications open between the agencies involved. The Incident
Commander (IC) contacted the PIO to provide a message to the public to make them aware of
the situation. The Office of Emergency Management (OEM) begins oversight of the situation for
public information. FBI has informed all agencies involved that they will be treating this
situation as an act of terrorism and will act accordingly.
At this time, the PIO prepared a statement to provide to the public. The broadcast was
given locally, and information about the broadcast is given to national news media outlets. The
PIO stated:
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“Please pay close attention. This is an urgent health message from the Houston
Department of Health and Human Services. Spores that cause anthrax disease have been
verified in the deaths of 56 persons from three separate hospitals. At this time, we do not
know the extent or the source site for the release of anthrax. We are investigating
currently to determine where the deceased individuals came into contact with the spores.
Currently local law enforcement, the FBI and HDHHS are working together to determine
the cause. Updated announcements will be made as soon as these officials know more.
Anthrax disease is not communicable so it cannot be transferred from person to person.
There is no need to worry about contracting anthrax if you have not been in any of the
three hospitals where the incidents occurred. Based on what we know, if you were in any
of the three hospitals from March 19 until recently, specifically in the newborn nursery,
post – op wing, or wound care and are experiencing symptoms of abdominal pain,
nausea, diarrhea, vomiting, please seek medical attention. Anthrax is treatable with
antibiotics. It is important that you follow instructions of health officials so you can
protect yourself, your family and your community and stay informed.”
Laboratory results coupled with the autopsies indicated that the deaths were due to Bacillus
anthracis bacterial infection of the gastrointestinal tract. This indicated that, at some point in
time, the deceased consumed a substance that was contaminated with anthrax spores.
On March 29, a letter was sent to the local FBI office. The letter is addressed to the FBI
spokesperson that recently appeared in a news cast, and the return address is from a local school
in the area. The letter was sent to the LRN, and preliminary tests showed there were no anthrax
spores in the letter or in the white powder that is released when opened. The white powder is
thought to be baby powder like the previous letters. The contents of the letter state:
YOU ARE WRONG
TAKE YOUR PENICILLIN
MORE WILL COME
DEATH TO IMMIGRANTS
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DEATH TO THE INFERIOR RACE
FBI personnel believe that the two incidents are now related. The FBI asked news anchors in the
local area to broadcast if anyone has seen any suspicious activity at the hospitals or if they
noticed any other suspicious behavior.
Staff personnel from the hospital that had previously called in sick are now showing up at
the available hospitals with symptoms that are similar to the flu. Hospital nurses feared the
symptoms were a result of anthrax due to inhalation. The staff personnel are asked to remain in
the hospital to receive treatment and allow the FBI to take their statements. Staff personnel were
from the floors that contained the newborn nursery, NICU, and post – op patients. Each staff
member recalled a nurse always attending the infants and believes it was the infants that had
died. Some staff members stated this nurse had conversed with a Certified Nurses Aid (CNA)
that was seen cleaning the rooms of some of the patients who had died. She was also seen
standing on a chair and messing with the vents in areas of the hospital with a can of compressed
air.
While the FBI attempted to locate the nurse and CAN, they noticed the amount of
persons in the emergency room coughing and complaining of chest pains. A nurse is stopped to
ask if the increase of patients is due to individuals who believe they are infected with anthrax or
if these individuals are sick. The nurse is unsure since she just started her shift and attempts to
find a nurse or staff personnel who have been working. One of the persons who appeared to be ill
was approached by the FBI and asked where they had been the past two weeks. The individual
stated that they had only been to school and to a concert event that just played at one of the
venues in Houston. When questioned further the FBI agent find out the concert took place on
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March 24th and 25th. The FBI agent noted that the performer at the venue was of an ethnic
minority.
Clinics and pharmacies started to notice an increase in the amount of persons who entered
showing symptoms similar to a cold or the flu. Pharmacy/drug stores were selling an increased
amount of over the counter medication for cold symptoms. In one clinic, two patients passed out
from fever in the waiting room and died within a matter of hours afterwards. Blood samples
from the two individuals were sent to the LRN to determine if anthrax was the cause of death.
FBI personnel notified the HDHHS and OEM of a possible aerosol attack of anthrax on
an entertainment venue. One of the staff persons from HDHHS asked the question that was on
everyone’s mind; why wasn’t it picked up by the BioWatch sensors? There were no answers to
the question, but the FBI felt the only thing they could do was work on getting as many people to
a hospital for treatment. HDHHS contacted the Department of State Health Services (DSHS) to
coordinate with the Governor’s Division of Emergency Management (GDEM) to request
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) materials if there was indeed a release of anthrax at the
entertainment venue.
FBI personnel conducted a search of the entertainment venue and determined with preliminary
field test kits that there were anthrax spores in the area. The Mayor was notified of the situation
and asked to approve a media message that the PIO could release to the public with an update of
events. The entertainment venue was then evacuated of staff currently working.
Hospitals that had not been shut down were becoming overcrowded in the emergency
room (ER) with patients complaining of chest pains and difficulty breathing along with fatigue
and headaches. It became chaos in the ER and some of the patients were becoming violent in fear
of being infected with anthrax. Patients started to shows signs of anxiety, and anger. Patients
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requested that they receive the anthrax vaccine and medication immediately without being seen
by a doctor.
During this time in Austin and San Antonio, patients were showing up in ER waiting
rooms with symptoms similar to the flu. One patient already died while waiting to be seen by a
doctor in San Antonio and three more have died in Austin hospitals. For fear that their hospitals
had also been attacked with anthrax, the lab immediately tests for anthrax. Causes for the four
deaths are unknown, but staffs at the hospital believe it to be anthrax.
The PIO in Houston gave a statement that was being broadcasted over national news
channels regarding the incident that was taking place in Houston and to give an update regarding
information of the entertainment venue:
“So far we have discovered that there may have been another release of anthrax at an
entertainment venue in downtown Houston. This was an event that took place on March
24th and 25th this past week. We ask all who have attended this event to please seek
medical attention if you are experiencing any of the following symptoms: fever above
100°F, coughing, shortness of breath, headache, muscle ache, fatigue, and chest pain.
We ask that everybody remain calm and remember that anthrax is not a communicable
disease if you did not attend the concert that took place on March 24th and 25th at this
entertainment venue in downtown Houston then there is no need to worry. Please follow
the instruction of your local health departments and we will get assistance to you as soon
as we can. When we learn more information, we will let you know.”
The FBI is investigated the entertainment venue and located what appeared to be crudely crafted
bombs attached to the rafters of the entertainment venue roof. The bombs seem to be attached to
cloth bags that have been torn open likely due to the explosion. There appeared to be six bags in
total three on each side of the roof. Preliminary field tests showed the bags to be contaminated
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with anthrax. The cloth bags and bomb devices were sent to LRN to identify that anthrax spores
were in the cloth bags.
Social media sites are flooded with comments from all over the U.S. criticizing the FBI
for leaving out information regarding the letters that were sent to the media stations. The forums
state that the FBI is trying to cover up that they did not “catch” the correct perpetrator during the
2001 anthrax letters. An immense distrust spread across the internet in regards to the FBI. The
protocol that was originally called into question during the investigation is being brought forth
once again. Comments were being left stating that it took the FBI seven years to accuse and
attempt to bring to trial the suspect, but he was never convicted due to his untimely death.
Another press conference was held to refute the claims that the letters were mailed by the
same individual as in 2001. FBI experts explained that the letters have a similar style to the
original anthrax letters mailed out; however, there were no anthrax spores inside the letters, and
the letters contents differ from those originally mailed in 2001. The level of sophistication in
regards to the code that was believed to be in the letters from 2001 were lacking in the letters that
were sent to the news stations. FBI experts believed the letters to be a hoax but were
investigating the matter and believed the two incidents were somehow connected. The goals of
the attacks differed from those in 2001.
DSHS contacted the CDC to request SNS assistance with antibiotics and anthrax vaccines
for those infected in the cities of Austin, Houston, and San Antonio. The majority of individuals
infected appeared to be in the Houston area and deaths increased in the hospitals treating the
patients. Personnel from the hospitals that were originally the site of anthrax releases started to
die. Two doctors who worked in pediatrics and one doctor who was a surgeon died. Nurses from
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the hospitals have become ill and appeared to be close to death, but the hospitals were limited on
space and were running out of antibiotics.
On March 30, push packs arrive from CDC, from undisclosed locations, to Austin,
Houston, and San Antonio. Texas Inventory Management System (TIMS) setup points of
distribution (POD) in each city. Death counts are 102 in Austin, 5,652 in Houston, and 72 in San
Antonio. FBI and hospital officials were expecting more deaths in Houston due to the capacity
of the entertainment venue being 18,043 and most persons were believed to reside in Houston
who attended the event. The event was held for two days with both days being sold out which led
to potential of 36, 086 deaths.
FBI officials were notified that another letter had been sent to a local new station. The
letter was dropped off at the reception desk and not sent through the mail system. The letter was
sent to LRN for testing. Preliminary tests identify anthrax spores outside the envelope. The
contents of the letter state:
YOU LOSE YOUR TOO LATE
YOU THOUGHT YOU HAD ME
TAKE MORE MEDICATION
THIS IS THE END
IMMIGRATION REFORM SHOULD NOT HAPPEN
DEATH TO IMMIGRANTS
DEATH TO THE INFERIOR RACE
Results from LRN showed that the anthrax spores from hospitals and the entertainment venue
were from the B. anthracis Ames strain. There appeared to be no nanoparticle silica or bentonite
around the capsules. There were contaminants mixed in with the spores and may be the reason
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the death count is not as high as expected for the amount of persons who were potentially
exposed during the concert.
Another press conference was setup by the PIO to notify the public of the string of letters
that had been sent to local media stations and the local FBI field office. The conference was also
used to direct individuals to the locations of distribution sites to receive a 10 day pill pack and be
informed of the need to take antibiotics for up 60 days.
Social media networks were being populated with comments on individuals not wanting
to take the antibiotics that were being distributed. Distrust ran wild from comments posted on the
social media sites. Rumors of the attack being conducted by the same individual as the 2001
attacks were still being discussed. A fear of hospitals started, and there were comments being
posted that the antibiotics were contaminated with anthrax spores. Rumors were being spread on
the internet that hospitals initially attacked started with contamination of antibiotics. Public
distrust of the government grew out of control. There was also criticism of why the BioWatch
sensors did not pick up on the biological agent when it had been activated for tularemia in
previous years.
The PIO gave a special news report to address the rumors that started over the internet
that were keeping individuals from receiving antibiotics from the designated areas:
“Please pay close attention. The FBI has concluded that the hospitals attacks were
conducted by two staff members at each hospital. It is believed that nurses who has
access to the newborn nursery and the NICU were contaminating infants’ formula with
spores of anthrax that resulted in death by gastrointestinal anthrax. One staff member
used a can of compressed air to disperse anthrax spores from a container into ventilation
shafts and in rooms of post-op and terminally ill patients. This terrorist group is more
than 10 members large and used jobs in the locations affected to disperse the anthrax. We
ask that persons who notice suspicious activity from employees, please report them to the
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FBI. We believe these individuals worked through a temporary employment agency to
enter the hospitals and on a local security crew for the event at the entertainment venue.
This group is ethnically motivated, so please report any suspicious behavior in regards to
ethnic discrimination that seems out of the ordinary.
We ask that all individuals understand that dispersal of antibiotics is to assist in limiting
the amount of deaths of persons potentially infected with anthrax. If you were at the
entertainment venue on March 24th and 25th, please report to the nearest distribution
center to receive antibiotics. Once we have more information we will give another
update.”
In the aftermath of the event, the FBI continued to investigate to determine the individuals
responsible for the attacks. So far they had identified two of the nurses who were implicated in
the attacks. These two nurses had died from inhalation anthrax. The CNAs who were reported to
have been the individuals to release anthrax in an aerosol form, in the hospital, have yet to be
identified. The FBI had determined that the entertainment venue security was infiltrated by a
member of the domestic terrorist group, and that was how they were able to move freely inside
the building and setup the timed bombs (Black Cats) that released anthrax from their containers.
Public distrust for government agencies increased due to the nature of the letters and fear
perpetrated through social media. The reported deaths in each city after four days were 123 in
Austin, 11,786 in Houston, and 89 in San Antonio, a total of 11, 998. The amount did not reflect
surrounding areas such as College Station, Huntsville, and Corpus Christi where individuals
might have traveled to see the two day event at the entertainment venue. Distribution of
antibiotics continued, and persons in the area of Houston have now become fearful of hospitals.
The incident ended and no other letters were received, and no other releases of anthrax were
reported.
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A public survey was given some months after the incident in Houston. Public distrust of
government agencies had increased. More than half of those surveyed have no faith in the
BioWatch sensor system and believe governments spending in those programs are useless. The
survey also uncovered that at least 2,000 persons who died due to anthrax did not seek medical
attention for fear of hospitals and interacting with government agencies.
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6. DISCUSSION
The above scenario is one of many possible outcomes using biological agents as
weapons. This scenario focused on the copycat phenomenon explained in the literature review
and the fear it can perpetuate through the media. Not only does this scenario challenge the
assumption that terrorists do not have the capability to disseminate a biological weapon (see
table 8.1); it challenges the assumption that the method of dissemination is in aerosol form.
Table 8.1: Capability Assumption
Assumption:
Terrorist groups have the capability to conduct a biological attack
Why am I confident this
assumption is correct?

In what circumstances might this
assumption be untrue?

Could it have been true in the past
but no longer be true today?
Why?

How much confidence do I have
that this assumption is valid?
If it turns out to be invalid, how
much impact would this have on
the analysis?

The availability of information from the internet allows for greater
understanding on biological processes. Videos on YouTube demonstrate how to
conduct different microbiology experiments that are useful in culturing bacteria
of any kind.
Circumstances where this would be untrue are if the information for a
procedure is not shown or described in detail on the internet. An example is the
gamma phage test for detecting B. anthracis. Access to this particular test is
limited unless an individual is a worker in a laboratory or in a profession where
identification of B. anthracis is regularly conducted.

In this case, it would be the opposite. The information for culturing B.
anthracis has been available since the 1950’s and has only become more
detailed with the advance in techniques and improvement of experiments.

I have a high level of confidence this assumption is true.

If the assumption is untrue, then the impact would be that only professionals or
those continuously working with a select agent would have the capability to
conduct a biological attack. The scenario would not be a true reflection of what
a domestic terrorist group can accomplish with a biological agent.

Conclusion (choose one):
Solid
X Correct with Some Caveats
Unsupported or Questionable
Caveats (if any):
The domestic terrorist group has to have the inclination to conduct the research to determine how they will culture
and weaponize the biological agent. Although information is accessible on the internet, the individual has to
understand the terminology that is used in scientific papers and know where to look to find additional information
for a specific agent.
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Not all terrorist attacks will utilize the most popular method of dissemination. Inhalation of any
biological agent is the ideal way to cause the most casualties; however, the scenario has
demonstrated a reduction in detection by utilizing a less “popular” form of dissemination.
Furthermore, the cascade effect of attacking targets in a coordinated timely manner lead to health
officials being overwhelmed and to a potential loss of over 36,000 lives.
The numbers that are reported in the scenario were generated based on the newborn
nursery of each hospital and the susceptibility of the targeted population. Infants are not given
antibiotics unless needed and, therefore, will not have much protection against the bacteria being
ingested. The victims at the concert event, especially those who attend the event on both days,
were exposed to twice as much of the biological agent than those who would have attended the
event for only one day. The author took into consideration that the spores produced contain
contaminants that would affect the efficacy of the agent to infect individuals. All of these factors
were considered in the formulation of numbers for the death toll in the scenario.
Indicators for this scenario are many; some indicators are more obvious, and some
indicators are not so obvious (see table 8.2). Because this event occurred in more than one
location with time between each attack, there are indicators for before the initial hospital attack
and for the duration of the attack. This means that from the time of the first reports of infant
deaths is around the same time that the concert event would have taken place.
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Table 8.2: What If? Analysis Indicators

Before
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Frequency of meetings increase with known ethnically discriminative individuals
Number of individuals attending meetings has increased
Known members of ethnically discriminative groups purchasing houses/land outside of
actual living area
Known members taking medical related jobs with temporary agencies (traveling nurse)
Known member of group leaving permanent residence, not business related for long
periods of time before returning
Two or more group members applying to the same job when they both do not work in
the same field.
Attendance at DIYbio laboratories
Purchase of laboratory equipment by more than one member
Communication between members becomes erratic or ceases
Group members apply to jobs in local security fields for the first time
Purchase of fireworks out of season
Internet searches for remote activated/timed bombs
Internet search for Bacillus anthracis information
Library records of books containing information on culturing Bacillus species
Access to social media forums containing information about bomb making or bacteria
growth
Internet searches for concert events targeted towards a specific ethnicity
Strong public opposition to a certain policy
During

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Anthrax identified but not inhalation type of symptoms
Victims of first attack are infants
Appearance of persons of a specific ethnicity seeking emergency care more often than
usual
Increased number of deaths due to unknown causes
Initial wave of victims is small, large group of victims may follow
Receiving packages that resemble past terrorist attacks
Large event is happening concurrently or within a week of first reported incidents
Social media sites that have conspiracy language appear more often
First attack was in an area where antibiotics could be easily administered to infected
individuals
Suspected person visiting social media sites for the purpose of perpetuating fear
Attack of first responders
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Indicators for before the incident are what would be expected, increased searches into
biological weapons specifically B. anthracis, increased meetings of known extremist groups, and
increased searches for purchasing laboratory equipment. This last one is now becoming an issue
as can be seen with the literature review on biohackers. If someone is purchasing laboratory
equipment for their own pursuit of knowledge how do you determine they are not creating a
biological weapon. Most important is to look at the indicators together as a whole rather than
separate. If an extremist group such as the one described in the scenario have increased meetings
and each member is buying laboratory equipment separately, this might be an indication that a
laboratory is being setup for the purposes of weaponizing a biological agent.
The “during” indicators have two that are particularly noteworthy. The first is one
that challenges the key assumption that terrorist groups generally do not attack children,
especially infants, directly. 92 They can be part of a group that is targeted and subsequently get
killed; however, it is more likely in the U.S that children are killed through criminal acts, not
terrorist acts. 93 In this scenario, the first victims to fall to this terrorist attack are infants in the
newborn nursery and NICU. From the perspective of the terrorist group, this is logical.
According to the Amendment XIV Section 1:
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside…nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law…” 94

92

A compiled list of attacks from all over the world against children has been compiled by Robert Johnston.
Terrorist and Criminal Attacks Targeting Children. http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp39ch.html
93
There is no definitive information on this topic. Looking at the database of attacks on children provided by Robert
Johnson and the websites from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, and the
American Academy of Pediatrics children are either used by foreign terrorist groups for suicide bombing, or in
regards to the U.S. are victims of mass group targeting and not the specific target. Most literature is aimed at treating
children with PTSD after a terrorist attack.
94
U.S. Const. Amendment XIV Sec 1. http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=014/llsl014.db&recNum=389 (accessed February 08, 2013).
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In the section defining the terrorist ideology, they are initiating an ethnic cleansing. In their eyes,
children of specific ethnicities born on U.S. soil to immigrant parents do not deserve to live in
the U.S. This is an extremist view that is present in domestic terrorist groups. This group is
conducting ethnic cleansing in hopes of changing immigration reform to the removal of
undocumented immigrants.
The second “during” indicator is in regards to first responders. The first responders on the
scene for this attack were the doctors that were treating the patients, mainly infants that were
infected with anthrax. Although the attack was not initially against the doctors and staff, the
attempt to aerosolize the spores by the CNA subsequently led to hospital staff becoming ill. As a
result in the scenario, two pediatricians were killed along with several nurses. This affects the
hospital’s ability to have enough staff to treat individuals that would be coming in as a result of
the second attack.
With all of these indicators together there are some recommendations that can be made to
assist in mitigating such an attack, or simply responding more efficiently if it occurs. There is no
way to limit access to literature that can be used to weaponize anthrax. As was demonstrated by
the author, any one person can find just about anything on the internet and can be validated once
you know what to look for. Instructions to weaponize anthrax given by eHow (see appendix) are
incorrect in some areas. It states that some chemicals are kept secret for a reason; however the
chemicals that are used to make anthrax spores stay suspended in the air longer are in scientific
papers.
One recommendation that can be made was first presented by the Committee on
Prepositioned Medical Countermeasures; integrate ethical principles and public engagement into
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the development of prepositioning strategies. 95 The way the author interprets this in regards to
this scenario is that the more the public knows about the availability of antibiotics during a
bioterrorism event the more likely they will understand and not be fearful to receive antibiotics.
In the case of this scenario individuals were afraid to get the antibiotics because the only news
they heard was that three hospitals had been shut down due to anthrax contamination. There may
have been some confusion about the entire event and persons may have thought that antibiotics
were not working. Educating people in the areas of antibiotics and biological agents and actions
that can be taken for a biological agent would assist in alleviating some of the fear brought on in
an attack.
Another program that has already been advocated for and needs to be further
strengthened is the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) which deals with enhancing medical
surge capacity. 96 In this scenario, three hospitals were shut down due to contamination of anthrax
at an unknown source. Even though anthrax is not communicable if the source is unknown the
hospital had to be shut down. With an increase in medical surge capacity, the surrounding
hospitals would be able to handle the influx of patients and better handle the second wave of
patients from the second attack. Another point that is brought forth in this same committee
hearing is the fact that even if there is enough space there are not enough personnel to respond.
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Institute of Medicine, Prepositioning Anitbiotics, 18
Gregg A. Pane, Is the Medical Community Ready if Disaster or Terrorism Strikes: Closing the Gap in Medical
Surge Capacity, Statement before the Subcommittee on Management Investigations and Oversight, House of
Representatives, January 25, 2010
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7. CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis was to design a scenario of a domestic bioterrorist attack using only
knowledge from internet sites, scientific journals, and academic journals. The level of knowledge
that one needs to conduct the experiments is at best high school level and intent. The processes
for each step in manufacturing anthrax are outlined in the literature available to the public. The
flow diagrams presented in this thesis are common ones that are used in microbiology
laboratories to conduct experiments. This does not mean that these experiments can be achieved
the first time. It may take multiple attempts to obtain a virulent strain of B. anthracis; however a
terrorist group only needs to get it right once. The one time that the terrorist group achieves
success makes the threat of a domestic terrorist biological attack fact.
7.1 Implications
This thesis focused specifically on the production of anthrax spores and the process to
weaponize them. This process can be extended to many other biological agents. If an individual
obtains a strain from any bacteria that are classified as Category A agents, all they have to do is
look into the scientific literature to determine how to weaponize it. The processes may be
different in regards to methods of culturing (anaerobic or aerobic bacteria) and media
preparation, but the principles are the same in regards to looking in the literature to find what is
needed.
With the advance of technology, the price for constructing a laboratory is becoming
cheaper. If the individual possess an inclination for scientific processes, he may be able to
substitute certain chemicals and equipment for less high profile items. With the availability of
DIYbio groups, this gap is closing even more. Science is becoming easier to access by non-
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scientific professionals, and this leads to an increase in the possibility of learning how to
weaponize biological agents.
This scenario also provides a valuable learning experience. Emergency management
exercises can utilize this scenario during a table – top exercise to train hospital staff and law
enforcement agents on how to respond to this attack. Knowing how to respond to a cascade
attack and the loss of a hospital is applicable to more than just a biological attack. If at any point
in time, more than one hospital is closed, city officials will have a suitable protocol in place to
avoid confusion and hasty decisions. Providing this scenario to students in a classroom setting
leads to generating new ideas on practices and policies that can be implemented during a
biological attack. Hindsight decisions are the purpose of What If? Analysis, and the more that are
generated the more prepared a city will be on the actions they can take before, during, and after
an attack.
This scenario was written for Houston, TX so all of the responses by city officials are
structured specifically for this city. This information was gathered from the City of Houston
Annexes H, I and information on the Office of Emergency Management website. For this reason,
if another city decides they want to use the scenario the responses of each office or agency will
change according to the structure of the other cities. Adaption of the scenario will not be
difficult, and makes it useful to all cities or other agencies that wish to practice preparing for a
biological attack of this nature.
7.2 Limitations
One of the limitations of this study was the inability to be as detailed as the author
wanted in the design of the scenario. Much of the processes and responses to bioterrorist attacks
are not released in their entirety, so the response in the scenario may not be as close to how

60

responders would act in real-life situations. The literature surrounding terrorist attacks is aimed
at responding to a mass casualty attack and not to a cascade type of attack.
Another limitation is the inability to test the scenario in regards to the science behind it.
The author understands that the scientific processes are in the literature, but the number of trials
it takes to effectively carry out these methods may be hindrance to terrorist groups. As was the
case with Aum Shinrikyo who could not effectively disseminate anthrax and botulinum toxin, a
domestic terrorist group may move on to a different method to achieve political influence.
The What IF? Analysis was conducted solely by the author so all assumptions, indicators,
and recommendations were from one person. Had this analysis been conducted by a group, more
assumptions could have been explored; more indicators could have been discovered; and more
recommendations could have been stated.
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